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I. INTRODUCTION !
What is it for a life to be meaningful? Let us start by getting clear on the topic. Susan 
Wolf  picks it out well, in two distinct ways. First, by reference to familiar needs or 
longings (and corresponding crises). Wolf  writes: !
A meaningful life is, first of  all, one that has within it the basis for an affirmative 
answer to the needs or longings that are characteristically described as needs for 
meaning. I have in mind, for example, the sort of  questions people ask on their 
deathbeds, or simply in contemplation of  their eventual deaths, about whether 
their lives have been (or are) worth living, whether they have had any point, and 
the sort of  questions one asks when considering suicide and wondering whether 
one has any reason to go on.  1!
The idea is that we can get a handle on the notion of  meaning in life by reflecting on 
what it is we are wondering whether our lives have (or lamenting that they lack) at 
times such as these. Meaning, whatever it is, is the sort of  thing that should have a 
tendency to put these longings or crises to rest were we to apprehend it clearly. 
Second, by reference to paradigms of  meaningful and meaningless lives. Wolf  
writes: !
Lives of  great moral or intellectual accomplishment – Gandhi, Mother Teresa, 
Albert Einstein – come to mind as unquestionably meaningful lives (if  any are); 
lives of  waste and isolation – Thoreau’s “lives of  quiet desperation,” typically 
anonymous to the rest of  us, and the mythical figure of  Sisyphus [condemned to 
roll a rock up a hill for eternity] – represent meaninglessness.  2!
Having cleared up the topic, let us now turn to theories of  meaning in life. The most 
influential contemporary theory is Wolf ’s own Fitting Fulfillment View.  According to 3
this view, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of  meaning in life. 
First, !
!
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that one be passionate about, or love, something one is doing. (The Passion 
Requirement.) !
One must, that is, be “gripped or excited”  by the activity in question, as opposed to 4
being “bored or alienated”  by everything about it. Being gripped or excited by 5
something one is doing, in turn, Wolf  tells us, involves having “good feelings”, but 
does not guarantee being happy.  Second, 6!
that the activity in question is objectively good. (The Objectivity Requirement.) !
The activity, that is, must have a value that is “independent of  and has its source outside 
of oneself ”, or, in other words, a value that “does not depend on one’s own contingent 
interest in [it]”.  It must be good in some way other than being good for oneself. 7
Wolf  nicely sums up her view in the following slogan: !
Meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.  8!
In this paper, I will argue that both of  Wolf ’s requirements are mistaken. On the 
theory I will defend, Consequentialism about Meaning in Life (or CML for short), !
(1) one’s life is meaningful at time t just in case one’s surviving at t would be good 
in some way (either subjectively or objectively), !
and !
(2) one’s life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was (or will 
be) made better in some way for one’s having existed. !
In Section II, I will argue that passion is not necessary for meaning in life, because an 
ability to contribute to objectively good things is sufficient for it.  In Section III, I will 9
argue that an ability to contribute to subjectively good things (i.e., things whose value 
depends on one’s own contingent interest in them) is also sufficient for one’s life to be 
meaningful at a time. !
II. THE PASSION REQUIREMENT !
I will first respond to three arguments for the passion requirement. I will then provide 
three objections to it. !
!
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 When I refer to an ability to contribute to good things, I mean just that one’s surviving 9
would have good consequences. What matters for the meaningfulness of  my life now, 
according to CML, is how the world would go were I to survive, not how it might go. If, were I 
to survive, I would give none of  my spare millions to Oxfam, my ‘ability’ to do so contributes 
nothing to my life’s being meaningful now.
Sisyphus Who Scares Away Vultures !
Consider, says Wolf, a modified version of  Sisyphus, whose rock rolling, unbeknownst 
to him, “scares away vultures who would otherwise attack a nearby community and 
spread terror and disease” . Such a Sisyphus is contributing to objectively good 10
things, but his life nonetheless seems completely meaningless. 
But his life does not seem completely meaningless to me! Indeed, it seems to have 
a great deal of  meaning owing to its good consequences for the villagers. Suppose this 
Sisyphus, in the grip of  a crisis of  meaning, were about to throw himself  off  the 
mountain, but we had one last chance to communicate with him. Here’s what I would 
say: “Wait, Sisyphus! Don’t do it! You don’t realise it, but your rock rolling is averting a 
great deal of  suffering. It’s scaring off  vultures that would otherwise attack nearby 
villagers and spread disease.” This seems like a perfectly appropriate thing to say, and 
its clear implication is that his life has meaning – meaning that he hasn’t been aware 
of. In telling him about the vultures, I’d be helping him to discover some meaning that 
his life already has. 
But if  Wolf  were right that passion is necessary for meaning, then there would be 
no positive news to give Sisyphus. If  he were to look to the heavens and cry, “O ye 
gods, what reason have I to live?”, we ought to remain silent. He has no passion for 
anything he is doing, and so, on Wolf ’s view, no reason to go on living. This, it seems 
to me, is highly implausible.  Indeed, it is obvious – isn’t it? – that depressed people 11
can be wrong that their lives are meaningless. If  Wolf ’s view were correct, then any 
passionless person who wonders whether his life has any meaning is conceptually confused 
– if  he knew what meaningfulness required, he would know that it didn’t have any! We 
can put the point in a slightly different way: A depressed person already knows he is 
depressed, he is wondering precisely whether he is right to feel this way. 
Undoubtedly, passion is important in our lives, and we often yearn for it if  we 
have none. Indeed, as I will be arguing in Section III, there is something similar to 
passion that suffices for meaning at a time. But it is a mistake to think that just because 
somebody is yearning for passion he is yearning for meaning. He may yearn for 
passion, while being in no doubt of  the meaningfulness of  his life. Consider !
The Master Economist. Alice spends her days managing the economy, something 
only she (given her talents) can do. She finds it utter drudgery, but knows she must 
continue because of  all the good she is doing. !
Alice may yearn for passion in her life, while having no doubt – not for one minute – 
of  its considerable meaningfulness. 
Related to this, it is vital not to confuse one’s life’s being meaningful with one’s 
having a sense of  meaning in one’s life. Whatever exactly the latter involves (whether it 
is simply a belief  that one’s life has meaning, or such a belief  combined with a certain 
kind of  positive feeling) one can surely have it without having any actual meaning in 
one’s life.  12
!
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The Crises of  Tolstoy and Mill !
R. W. Hepburn writes: !
To give life meaning cannot be just a matter of  pursuing worthy projects, for that 
account fails to cope with phenomena like Tolstoy’s arrest of  life, or John Stuart 
Mill’s during his mental crisis of  1826.  13!
Hepburn’s worry is that, if  making a contribution to objectively good things were 
sufficient for meaning in life, then it would be inexplicable how Tolstoy and Mill, who 
surely could not have doubted the worth of  their projects, suffered crises. 
However, the memoirs of  both Tolstoy and Mill reveal that they suffered their 
respective crises only after doubting the value or worth of  their projects. In A 
Confession, Tolstoy writes !
Amidst my thoughts of  farming, which interested me very much during that time, 
there would suddenly pass through my head a question like this: “All right, you 
are going to have six thousand desyatinas of  land in the Government of  Samara, 
and three hundred horses, – and then?” And I completely lost my senses and did 
not know what to think farther. Or, when I thought of  the education of  my 
children, I said to myself: “Why?” Or, reflecting on the manner in which the 
masses might obtain their welfare, I suddenly said to myself: “What is that to 
me?” Or, thinking of  the fame which my works would get me, I said to myself: 
“All right, you will be more famous than Gogol, Pushkin, Shakespeare, Moliere, 
and all the writers in the world, – what of  it?” And I was absolutely unable to 
make any reply. The questions were not waiting, and I had to answer them at 
once; if  I did not answer them, I could not live.  14!
Here, Tolstoy seems to be attributing his crisis of  meaning to doubts about the worth 
of  his farming, his children’s education, his writing, and the welfare of  the masses for 
which he had been striving for so long. 
What led him to doubt the worth of  these things? He says it was thoughts of  
mortality (both his own and others). He writes: !
Sooner or later there would come diseases and death (they had come already) to 
my dear ones and to me, and there would be nothing left but stench and worms. 
All my affairs, no matter what they might be, would sooner or later be forgotten, 
and I myself  should not exist. So why should I worry about all these things?  15!
In Tolstoy’s case, then, it seems that thoughts of  mortality led him to question the 
worth of  his activities, which, in turn, gave rise to his crisis of  meaning. Only then did 
he lose passion for his activities. He is, then, properly understood, a counterexample to 
the views of  Hepburn and Wolf. 
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As for Mill, he explicitly put his crisis down to a feeling that the end to which he 
was devoting his life, the progress of  humanity, was worthless. He writes: !
The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in 
the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for...[The] destiny of  mankind in 
general was ever in my thoughts...I felt that unless I could see my way to some 
better hope than this for human happiness in general, my dejection must 
continue.  16!
Mill, it is true, lost all passion for his activities. But this occurred only after and because 
he came to doubt the worth or point of  them. !
The Result Machine !
Thaddeus Metz asks us to consider a thought experiment of  Robert Nozick’s, The 
Result Machine, which can be programmed to bring about any outcome whatever. If  a 
consequentialist theory (like CML) were true, Metz says,  !
then a maximally meaningful life would be one that programmed the machine, or 
pushed the relevant buttons, so as to bring about as much objective value as it 
could.  17!
However, he claims, !
That judgment is counterintuitive. Even if  it were the case that one ought to get 
the machine running, one’s life would not be maximally meaningful for having 
done so. Instead, a fully meaningful life, insofar as it involves the promotion of  
objective value, requires effortful or hands on activity.  18!
He then offers a similar case of  his own: !
Less fantastically, merely cutting a check to Oxfam, donating funds that one was 
lucky to inherit, would not be as meaningful as laboring in the poor community 
that Oxfam seeks to benefit, supposing the latter produced only marginally fewer 
objectively good long-term outcomes than the former. However, 
[consequentialism] cannot account for that intuition, since the nature of  the 
means by which the objective value is brought about  does not matter...[The] 
more that is brought about by whatever...mechanism, the more meaningful one’s 
life.  19!
It is essential, however, to distinguish between two ways in which a person can be said 
to do something good. Suppose you are at the beach when you see a child drowning in 
shallow water. You wade in and lift her out, saving her life. Had you not done so, your 
friend Mary would have done so instead (at no cost to Mary or anyone else). Here, 
!
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there is a sense in which you have done something good. It is good that the child was 
saved, and you are the one who saved her. But there is also a sense in which you did not 
do anything good, for had you not waded into the water, the world would be no worse 
a place.  20
CML, as I intend it, says only that it is when one would, by surviving, make a 
contribution to good things that would not otherwise be made that one’s life is meaningful 
now. Hence, according to CML, my ability to press Nozick’s button confers meaning 
on my life now only if, were I not to press it, it would not get pressed (or if, were somebody else to 
press it, there would be some cost associated with that). If  my friend Mary were standing by, 
ready to press the button if  I did not, or someone else would be offered the chance to 
do so, and at no cost to anybody, then my ability to press it, according to CML, does 
not confer meaning on my life now. Perhaps what is leading Metz to think that my 
ability to press the button does not make my life maximally meaningful now is that he 
is assuming that the button is easy to press, so that if  I did not press it somebody else 
would. 
It is for a similar reason that another of  Wolf ’s arguments for the passion 
requirement, her ‘bored assembly line worker’ , fails. According to Wolf, if  an ability 21
to contribute to objectively good things were sufficient for meaning in life, then the 
work of  such an assembly line worker would have to add at least some meaning to her 
life. But clearly it does not – her life may be utterly meaningless. 
But assembly line work, very often, does not require a lot of  skill or training, and 
so one may be easily replaced in it. If  there were many unemployed people looking for 
work, then Wolf ’s assembly line worker may not have an ability to contribute to 
anything good in the relevant (Robust) sense, for she may not be making a contribution to 
good things that would not otherwise be made. Of  course, if  she were using her 
income to feed her family, who would not otherwise be fed, then CML does entail that 
her work adds meaning to life – but this seems exactly right. 
This distinction between two ways in which a person might do good things is 
central to the right account of  why our relationships are so important a source of  
meaning in our lives. The contribution we make to the lives of  those who love us – in 
certain cases simply by our continuing to exist (for example, in the case of  a severely 
handicapped person or a bedridden grandmother) – is one that cannot be made by 
anyone else. For example, the quality of  the pleasures that our company affords those 
who love us is unique – these pleasures could not be provided by anyone else.  22
Here is an additional suggestion for what is confusing philosophers like Metz. 
According to CML, while my ability to press Nozick’s button (assuming that it would 
not otherwise be pressed) confers a great deal of  meaning on my life as it is now (i.e., 
adds a great deal to the present momentary meaningfulness of  my life), my actually 
pressing it, if  this would result in there being nothing more that I could ever do to 
contribute to good things, would mean that, once I had pressed it, my life could never 
again be momentarily meaningful in the slightest. Similarly, while my ability to write 
the cheque to Oxfam, and my ability to go work as a laborer in the poor community, 
may confer roughly equal amounts of  meaning on my life as it is now, my actually 
!
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going to work there as a laborer would make my life momentarily meaningful for 
longer, because, were I to do that, I would, at each new moment, be continuing to be a 
source of  good things in the world. 
Of  course, it is perfectly true that, according to CML, my writing the check to 
Oxfam, if  it is for a sufficiently large amount, may do more to make my life 
meaningful considered as a whole than would my going to work in the poor community. 
Some may find this hard to accept. I must admit, though, that I do not. It seems 
plausible to me that the ultra wealthy have an opportunity to add meaning to their 
lives that the vast majority of  us lack. This, of  course, it must be emphasised, does not 
mean that the ultra wealthy have an opportunity to be either better people or better off 
than the rest of  us. A person’s moral worth is not plausibly determined by her actual 
contributions, but only by those she would make if  given the chance. And meaning in life 
is not intrinsically good for one. It does not belong on a so-called ‘objective list’ theory 
of  welfare. 
Finally, suppose an ability to contribute to subjectively good things is also sufficient 
for one’s life to be meaningful at a time (a claim I will be arguing for in Section III). In 
this case, my going to work in the poor community would very likely provide me with 
a kind or source of  meaning that no amount of  cheque-writing could possibly provide. 
This is because it – unlike cheque-writing – would, in all likelihood, be a life-changing 
and fulfilling experience for me. !
The Paradigms !
Recall the paradigms of  meaningful lives: Gandhi’s, Mother Teresa’s, Einstein’s, etc. 
What is distinctive about these? It seems to be nothing other than the enormity of  their 
contributions to society. 
To see that this is so, consider that most of  us have no idea whether these 
individuals were fulfilled in their lives, whether they had any passion for their 
activities. Most of  us know only of  their great contributions. Suppose we discovered 
that Einstein thought about mathematics only to silence voices in his head that were 
preventing him from getting to sleep at night, and that he had no passion for anything 
in his life, let alone solving those blasted math problems. Would we cease to think of  
his life as a paradigm of  meaningfulness, and instead come to regard it as having been 
completely meaningless? Of  course not! If  an Einstein like this were to walk up to us 
and complain that his life was meaningless, that there was no point to it, etc., it would 
seem perfectly appropriate for us to insist he was mistaken, and to try to show him all 
the good his ideas were doing.  23!
Ambiguity of  “A Life Worth Living” !
As Wolf  says, a meaningful life is one that is ‘worth living’. However, there is an 
important ambiguity in the phrase ‘a life worth living’ that I suspect is confusing some 
philosophers who believe that passion is necessary for meaning in life. 
!
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In one sense, a life is worth living if  and only if  its subject has a self-interested reason 
to go on living it – i.e., just in case it is a life that is worth living for her. For this to be so, 
some passion for one’s activities is arguably required. However, there seems also to be 
a sense in which one’s life can be worth living even if  one lacks a self-interested reason 
to go on living it – even, that is, if  it is not worth living for one. It is worth living in this 
latter sense just in case one is contributing (in a Robust way) to good things. It is a life 
worth living in this latter sense, I would suggest, that is equivalent to what we are 
engaged in investigating in the literature on meaning in life. Consider, once again, 
crises of  meaning. We may, it seems, coherently wonder whether our life is worth 
living, even if  we know that it is not worth living for us. 
Finally, it is worth noting that it is plausible that some of  us must have lives that are 
worth living for ourselves if  any of  us is to have a life worth living solely in virtue of  his 
contributions to objectively good things. This is because, if  no lives were worth living 
for their subjects, then (on the plausible assumption of  welfarism about value – more 
on this in Section III) there could be nothing of  value in the universe, and so no way 
that any one of  us could contribute to anything objectively good. !
It’s A Wonderful Life !
Consider George Bailey in the film It’s A Wonderful Life.  When George discovers he 24
has been framed for fraud and is soon to be arrested, he is so despondent that he goes 
to the town bridge to throw himself  off  it. He is saved by Clarence, his guardian angel, 
who takes him on a tour of  Bedford Falls (now ‘Pottersville’, after the nefarious Mr. 
Potter) as it would have been had he, George, never existed. Everyone is much worse 
off. His mother is a bitter landlady. His friends (the local bartender and policeman) are 
ungenerous, unhappy people. The local pharmacist, whom George had prevented 
from accidentally poisoning a child, is in prison. George’s younger brother, having not 
been saved from drowning by George when they were children, did not go on to 
become a war hero, and so did not himself  save countless lives. Worst of  all, George’s 
beloved Mary is a dejected spinster. Seeing all this restores George’s will to live, and he 
is returned to reality, whereupon he dashes home to be reunited with his family. 
What is Clarence trying to get George to realise by showing him Pottersville? A 
natural answer is the meaningfulness of  his life. What Clarence shows George, however, 
is strictly his contributions to the lives of  others. At no point does George’s mind turn to 
any passion he has had for his own activities. Indeed, it is doubtful whether George 
has ever had much passion for his own activities – he is depicted as having yearned, 
his whole life, to get out of  Bedford Falls. In any case, the thoughts responsible for 
reigniting George’s will to live, his sense that his life has meaning, are only of  his 
importance to the lives of  his friends and family. !
III. THE OBJECTIVITY REQUIREMENT 
I will first respond to Wolf ’s main argument for the objectivity requirement. I will then 
provide a counterexample to the requirement. 
Sisyphus Fulfilled !
!
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Wolf  asks us to consider !
a person who simply loves smoking pot all day, and another (or maybe the same 
person) who is fulfilled doing crossword puzzles, or worse (as personal experience 
will attest), Sudokus. We might also consider more bizarre cases: a man who lives 
to make handwritten copies of  the text of  War and Peace; or a woman whose world 
revolves around her love for her pet goldfish...[Consider also] Sisyphus 
Fulfilled...who loves stone-rolling more than anything else in the (after-)world.  25!
Not only are these people passionate about their activities, Wolf  says, their activities 
are subjectively good (i.e., good in virtue of  being good for them). But these activities 
clearly add nothing in the way of  meaning to their lives. The upshot, Wolf  thinks, is 
that activities need to be objectively good if  they are to add meaning to one’s life. 
I agree with Wolf  that the activities of  these people may add nothing to meaning 
in their lives. But I think she is mistaken that these activities are subjectively good. 
Why is this? It is because for something to be good in virtue of  being good for 
someone, it must add to this person’s lifetime welfare, and the activities in Wolf ’s 
examples, while they may increase their subjects’ momentary welfare at the time of  
experience, add nothing to these people’s lifetime welfare.  
I will not here defend the claim that for something to be good in virtue of  being 
good for someone, it must add to this person’s lifetime welfare.  But I do want to say 26
something in defense of  the idea that the activities in Wolf ’s examples add nothing to 
these people’s lifetime welfare. The reason they add nothing, I believe, is that what 
they provide is ‘just more of  the same’. The right theory of  lifetime welfare (whether it 
is a hedonistic, desire-satisfactionist, or pluralistic one) should say that having more of  
exactly the same kind of  momentary benefit adds nothing in and of  itself  to lifetime 
welfare (though it may, of  course, add instrumentally, by, say, improving one’s ability to 
think clearly or function well). It is only new kinds of  momentary benefits – for 
example, qualitatively new pleasures, new kinds of  aesthetic experiences, different or 
deeper insights into the nature of  things, etc. – that in and of  themselves can add 
anything to lifetime welfare. Smoking more pot, making more copies of  War and Peace, 
rolling more rocks, etc., adds nothing in and of  itself. 
This seems to be why thoughts concerning the cyclical nature of  our lives can so 
easily induce crises of  meaning. Consider Joel Feinberg’s description of  the thoughts 
that led him to suffer crises of  meaning while watching shoppers go about their 
business in a bustling marketplace: !
Why are all those people standing in line before the cash registers? In order to 
purchase food. Why do they purchase food? In order to stay alive and healthy. 
Why do they wish to stay alive and healthy? So that they can work at their jobs. 
Why do they want to work? To earn money. Why do they want to earn money? 
So they can purchase food. And so on, around the circle, over and over, with no 
‘significant culmination’ in sight.  27!
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It is, I believe, not the lack of  a significant culmination per se that can make us feel that 
these people’s lives are meaningless, but the fact that their activities are ‘just more of  
the same’. They seem, for this reason, to add nothing to these people’s lifetime welfare, 
and so to be of  no positive value. 
Richard Taylor, also, writes: 
  
We toil after goals, most of  them – indeed, every single one of  them – of  
transitory significance and, having gained one of  them, we immediately set forth 
for the next, as if  that one had never been, with this next one being essentially 
more of  the same. Look at a busy street any day, and observe the throng going 
hither and thither. To what? Some office or shop, where the same things will be 
done today as were done yesterday, and are done now so they may be repeated 
tomorrow...Most such effort is directed only to the establishment and 
perpetuation of  home and family; that is, to the begetting of  others who will 
follow in our steps to do more of  the same.  28!
If  I am right, these thoughts are apt to induce crises of  meaning because they depict 
us as living in such a way that we are not becoming any better off  in our lives considered 
as a whole, and so as contributing to nothing of  value. 
This account also explains what is missing in some other famously meaningless 
lives – for example, those of  David Wiggins’ Hog Farmer (who “grows more corn to 
feed more hogs to buy more land to grow more corn to feed more hogs” ), Wolf ’s 29
Blob (who “spends day after day, or night after night, in front of  a television set, 
drinking beer and watching situation comedies”), as well as her Idle Aristocrat (who “flits 
about, fighting off  boredom, moving from one amusement to another”) . Consider 30
also the lives of  Taylor’s Glow Worms: !
This goes on month after month, the blind worm lying there in the barren 
stillness waiting to entrap an occasional bit of  nourishment that will only sustain it 
to another bit of  nourishment until...Until what? What great thing awaits all this 
long and repetitious effort and makes it worthwhile? Really nothing. The larva 
just transforms itself  finally to a tiny winged adult that lacks even mouth parts to 
feed and lives only a day or two. These adults, as soon as they have mated and 
laid eggs, are themselves caught in the threads and are devoured by the 
cannibalist worms, often without having ventured into the day, the only point to 
their existence having now been fulfilled. This has been going on for millions of  
years, and to no end other than that the same meaningless cycle may continue for 
another millions of  years.  31!
Finally, consider the young mother discussed in Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine 
Mystique, who tries to account for her feeling of  ennui as follows: !
!
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I ask myself  why I am so dissatisfied. I’ve got my health, fine children, a lovely 
new home, enough money...It’s as if  ever since you were a little girl, there’s always 
been somebody or something that will take care of  your life: your parents, or 
college or falling in love, or having a child, or moving to a new house. Then you 
wake up one morning and there’s nothing to look forward to.  32!
In discussing her case, Peter Singer notes that it was mainly women who experienced 
such a loss of  purpose in the fifties, because !
most men, but relatively few women, worked in jobs that held out the prospect of  
a promotion, an increase in responsibility and power...So when one morning a 
man wakes up and asks himself, ‘Is this all there is to my life?’ he can quieten the 
doubts by thinking about that coming glorious day when he gets to move up to a 
more important position, with higher pay and more responsibility. That is why, as 
both employers and unions have found, a career structure, a ladder leading 
upwards, is often more crucial for job satisfaction than actual rates of  pay. In 
contrast, for a housewife there is no promotion. Romance will fade, and the 
children will need their mother less and less.  33!
For all these individuals, there is (as far as they can see) nothing new on the horizon. If  I am 
right, this means that (once again, from their persective) there is no further increase 
possible in their own levels of  lifetime welfare, and so nothing even subjectively good 
that depends on their own continued existence. 
I conclude that Wolf ’s argument does not establish that one’s activities need to be 
objectively good if  they are to add meaning to one’s life. While it is true that the 
activities she mentions probably add nothing in and of  themselves to meaning in their 
subjects’ lives, they are not, as Wolf  claims, subjectively good. !
The Shipwrecked Botanist !
I want now to provide an example of  a life that is only subjectively good, but seems 
meaningful nonetheless. Consider !
The Shipwrecked Botanist. A botanist has been shipwrecked alone on a desert island 
with all of  his books and instruments. He cannot believe his luck! Finally, he has 
an opportunity to fulfill his long-held ambition of  studying exotic desert island 
flora. !
We might add that he is a talented artist, with a keen interest in tropical landscapes, 
and has been shipwrecked along with all of  his painting supplies. 
Could the life of  this botanist be meaningful on the island? Certainly, it could be. 
Indeed, it is tempting to think that it could be far more meaningful there than back in 
his homeland – especially if  we assume that he loathed his day job, had little spare 
time to pursue his passions, and had no especially close friends or family. But the 
moment he washed up on this island was exactly the moment at which his life ceased 
to be objectively valuable, for he is all alone on this island. (Assume that he will never 
!
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be discovered or have any effect whatsoever ever again on the lives of  others.) 
I am here assuming welfarism about value, the view that something can be good 
only by being good for some being or beings. Wolf  may reject this assumption. 
Indeed, she writes (though not in response to the sort of  objection I have raised here): !
Creating art, adding to our knowledge of  the world,...seem intuitively to deserve 
classification as valuable activities, even if  they do not bring about obvious 
improvement in human or animal welfare.  34!
Similarly, the mere “exercise of  virtue and talent – of  intellectual creativity and 
integrity, of  patience, discipline, and determination – has value in itself ”.  35
If  Wolf  were right that such things are valuable independently of  their 
contribution to people’s welfare, then the shipwrecked botanist could, even on her 
Fitting Fulfillment View, have a meaningful life on the island. But it is very hard to 
believe that these things are objectively valuable. What is the point of  making 
beautiful objects, gaining knowledge of  the world, or developing skills, if  nobody – not 
even oneself  – will benefit from these things? Intuitively, it would be better to confer 
even the smallest benefit upon somebody than to do any of  these things.  36!
Lifetime Meaningfulness !
Before concluding, I wish to make one final point. If  CML is true, then it may be that 
one’s life can be meaningful considered as a whole only if  one contributes to objectively 
good things. Why is this? According to CML, a person’s life was meaningful 
considered as a whole just in case the world was (or will be) made better in some way 
as a result of  this person’s having existed. But there is reason to think that one’s having 
existed can be good only objectively. It cannot be subjectively good, because it cannot 
be good for oneself. Why can’t it be good for oneself ? Here’s why: !
(1) Something is good for a person only if  it makes him better off  in some way 
than he would otherwise have been. !
(2) Had a person not existed, then he would not have been, and so would not have 
had a level of  welfare. !
Therefore, !
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 It is beyond the scope of  this essay to give a full defense of  welfarism. For more on 36
welfarism, see Bramble (2014) and Roger Crisp & Andrew Moore, ‘Welfarism in moral 
theory’, Australasian Journal of  Philosophy 74 (1996), pp. 598-613. Note that, while welfarism 
provides support for CML, CML neither entails nor relies on welfarism.
(4) One’s having existed cannot be good for oneself.  37!
Suppose this is right. Perhaps it is a failure to distinguish between one’s life’s being 
meaningful at a time and one’s having had a meaningful life considered as a whole that 
explains why some philosophers are tempted to think that meaning at a time requires 
an ability to contribute to objectively good things. !
IV. CONCLUSION !
I want to conclude with a clear statement of  why, if  CML is true, almost every human 
life is somewhat meaningful, both at most times and considered as a whole. It is 
because (1) for the vast majority of  us, continuing to exist at any given time would 
result in our becoming better off  in some way in our life considered as a whole, or at 
least in one of  our friends or loved ones becoming better off  in some way in his life 
considered as a whole, and (2) most of  us will make, during the course of  our lives, at 




 Something like this argument has been suggested by many philosophers. See, for example, 37
John Broome, Ethics Out Of  Economics (Cambridge, 1999), p. 168. Note that an advocate of  
CML needn’t accept this argument, and is not committed to (4).
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